1) you mentioned in the end that it seems dishonest to say they were originally meant mythologically. I think this is a category error. Insofar as ancient societies didn't build their narratives through an objective method such as the scientific method, the entire intellectual enterprise does not contain distinctions between myth and fact. This means that whether or not it's true under analysis we may be able to do, what they were doing was what Gilman called secondary reflection. Granted, it was probably due to true naivete as opposed to second naivete, but it's place within the religious framework is determined by its mythological significance which was essentially what it's originators were doing.
2) While you discuss the ramifications of treating certain religous truths as myth vs. fact, I think from a scholarly POV that would constitute an argument from consequences. While from an internal denominational perspective these choices are crucial decisions in determining the future direction, doesn't it bother you that there is something missing there that is not considering the claims based on their own value?
3) Even more generally, once we establish that religion uses the language of myth, I see no reason to continue to a priori assume that it's truths are ever objective without confirmation. (This is only a challenge for the approach which adopts mythology wholesale as opposed to some watered down version such as allegory or the like.) Basically, it's either mythologization or not, and I don't see how moderate mythologization as an approach is defensible.
4) if this approach is accepted I think gilmans distinction between a live myth and a dead myth is inevitable. While we can disagree on what criteria precisely determine a myth dead, it still calls for a critical approach towards which elements we continue to uphold or at least emphasize vs. those which are rendered irrelevant.
5) The analysis of Maimonides' approach needs to properly contextualized. Maimonides was facing the challenges of Aristotlean philosophy where arguments are usually deductive, not inductive. His terminology of 'proof' or even 'demonstration' (depending on translation) are relevant for the philosophy of his day, but are less applicable to modern science. This is not that modern science is inherently unreliable as would be suggested by Maimonides' terms (although granted it does have its limits), but because a new approach must be carefully modeled to account for the methods created in the last centuries. While soft sciences are often not 'proven', they are often overwhelmingly demonstrable through inductive arguments and empirical evidence. For example, I would say (and I'm using this example to not offend many modern orthodox sensibilities) that Hebrew being a descendant of Canaanite and earlier semitic languages is an undeniable fact, the lack of 'proof' notwithstanding.
When religion becomes pure myth, it dies. Myths are wonderful but they are basically a form of literature. And literature can indeed inspire, but it does not sustain community the way religion does. There has to be some element of truth. For my part, if there’s nothing true about the Exodus story, if it’s just an inspiring myth, then it’s not so compelling anymore, and it certainly doesn’t give me chills. If it gives you chills, I suspect that’s because you were raised with it. Music that I was raised with also gives me chills, but it doesn’t necessarily give chills to my child, if you take my meaning.
Jordan Peterson gets by by asserting, psychological truths beneath the myths following Jung. And that works to an extent, but even Peterson is moving toward belief. Without some level of literal belief, mythology does not command our allegiance. And we might just as well find meaning and say, Hinduism.
But I like the approach at the end of modified mythology. It won’t satisfy the rationalists as you can see from some of the comments here, but it allows many of us to maintain our allegiance to Judaism.
I'm not sure exactly what you are referring to by "in cases of proven falsity" (although I can guess) but I don't think it "feels like cheating" to suggest a wide variety of interpretations, as long as they are plausible readings and don't completely contradicts the mesorah. It's a staple of our beliefs that there are שבעים פנים לתורה and we have a long history of commentators devising novel interpretations to explain text that otherwise seemingly defies reasoning, reconcile contradictions within the text, resolve seeming conflicts with reality or history, or simply come up with more elegant readings. If this "mythologization" is a plausible pshat (or drush, or remez, etc) and speaks to a person, great. If not, also great. No commentary is expected to make everybody happy.
R Ahron Lichtenstein ZL used to quote R Yisrael Salanter to the effect that if you don’t believe in any Aggados Chazal you are a kofer snd if you believe all of them you are an am Haaretz
All in all, this sounds like the kind of book which I'd buy, except it would would just sit accusingly on my shelf while I keep meaning to read it but never actually get around to doing much beyond skimming. (Not a knock on the author. I'm just a serial index-peruser.)
"Unlike Gillman and Peterson, Cohen does not claim that these beings never existed. To the contrary, he does everything in his power to retain the plausibility of the Torah’s narratives while adding an extra mythological layer on top of it."
That's because he doesn't want to be put in cherem and then shot.
There are also many in the yeshivah world for which an allegorical/mythological understanding of many agadata--especially the fantastical ones-- is the standard, traditional approach.
Beautifully presented. A few comments:
1) you mentioned in the end that it seems dishonest to say they were originally meant mythologically. I think this is a category error. Insofar as ancient societies didn't build their narratives through an objective method such as the scientific method, the entire intellectual enterprise does not contain distinctions between myth and fact. This means that whether or not it's true under analysis we may be able to do, what they were doing was what Gilman called secondary reflection. Granted, it was probably due to true naivete as opposed to second naivete, but it's place within the religious framework is determined by its mythological significance which was essentially what it's originators were doing.
2) While you discuss the ramifications of treating certain religous truths as myth vs. fact, I think from a scholarly POV that would constitute an argument from consequences. While from an internal denominational perspective these choices are crucial decisions in determining the future direction, doesn't it bother you that there is something missing there that is not considering the claims based on their own value?
3) Even more generally, once we establish that religion uses the language of myth, I see no reason to continue to a priori assume that it's truths are ever objective without confirmation. (This is only a challenge for the approach which adopts mythology wholesale as opposed to some watered down version such as allegory or the like.) Basically, it's either mythologization or not, and I don't see how moderate mythologization as an approach is defensible.
4) if this approach is accepted I think gilmans distinction between a live myth and a dead myth is inevitable. While we can disagree on what criteria precisely determine a myth dead, it still calls for a critical approach towards which elements we continue to uphold or at least emphasize vs. those which are rendered irrelevant.
5) The analysis of Maimonides' approach needs to properly contextualized. Maimonides was facing the challenges of Aristotlean philosophy where arguments are usually deductive, not inductive. His terminology of 'proof' or even 'demonstration' (depending on translation) are relevant for the philosophy of his day, but are less applicable to modern science. This is not that modern science is inherently unreliable as would be suggested by Maimonides' terms (although granted it does have its limits), but because a new approach must be carefully modeled to account for the methods created in the last centuries. While soft sciences are often not 'proven', they are often overwhelmingly demonstrable through inductive arguments and empirical evidence. For example, I would say (and I'm using this example to not offend many modern orthodox sensibilities) that Hebrew being a descendant of Canaanite and earlier semitic languages is an undeniable fact, the lack of 'proof' notwithstanding.
When religion becomes pure myth, it dies. Myths are wonderful but they are basically a form of literature. And literature can indeed inspire, but it does not sustain community the way religion does. There has to be some element of truth. For my part, if there’s nothing true about the Exodus story, if it’s just an inspiring myth, then it’s not so compelling anymore, and it certainly doesn’t give me chills. If it gives you chills, I suspect that’s because you were raised with it. Music that I was raised with also gives me chills, but it doesn’t necessarily give chills to my child, if you take my meaning.
Jordan Peterson gets by by asserting, psychological truths beneath the myths following Jung. And that works to an extent, but even Peterson is moving toward belief. Without some level of literal belief, mythology does not command our allegiance. And we might just as well find meaning and say, Hinduism.
But I like the approach at the end of modified mythology. It won’t satisfy the rationalists as you can see from some of the comments here, but it allows many of us to maintain our allegiance to Judaism.
I'm not sure exactly what you are referring to by "in cases of proven falsity" (although I can guess) but I don't think it "feels like cheating" to suggest a wide variety of interpretations, as long as they are plausible readings and don't completely contradicts the mesorah. It's a staple of our beliefs that there are שבעים פנים לתורה and we have a long history of commentators devising novel interpretations to explain text that otherwise seemingly defies reasoning, reconcile contradictions within the text, resolve seeming conflicts with reality or history, or simply come up with more elegant readings. If this "mythologization" is a plausible pshat (or drush, or remez, etc) and speaks to a person, great. If not, also great. No commentary is expected to make everybody happy.
R Ahron Lichtenstein ZL used to quote R Yisrael Salanter to the effect that if you don’t believe in any Aggados Chazal you are a kofer snd if you believe all of them you are an am Haaretz
Very enjoyable podcast interview with the author here:
https://seforimchatter.com/2025/03/16/nephilim-giants-and-fallen-angels-according-to-chazal-with-r-yisroel-cohen/
All in all, this sounds like the kind of book which I'd buy, except it would would just sit accusingly on my shelf while I keep meaning to read it but never actually get around to doing much beyond skimming. (Not a knock on the author. I'm just a serial index-peruser.)
Oh it’s not just me. Good…
"Unlike Gillman and Peterson, Cohen does not claim that these beings never existed. To the contrary, he does everything in his power to retain the plausibility of the Torah’s narratives while adding an extra mythological layer on top of it."
That's because he doesn't want to be put in cherem and then shot.
Depending on your POV the greatest genius or the original sin of Kabbalah is the re-mythologization of Judaism
"(though it does feel a little like cheating to insist that such stories were intended to be read mythologically from the outset"
Why? If they are clearly contrasted with secular myths as a counterpoint I think the original audience would've clearly recognized them as parody.
https://edwardnathanschwarz.substack.com/p/geraldo-rivera-finally-finds-al-capones?r=5e930t
Ark of the Covenant anyone?
In the opening paragraph:
>> one of Conservative Judaism's
>> leading thinkers
I could be entirely mistaken, but "leading thinker" strikes me as an oxymoron. No one ever led just by thinking. One leads only by *doing.*
A similar argument can be posited towards aggadah, although there are many in the Yeshiva world would read it as pshat.
There are also many in the yeshivah world for which an allegorical/mythological understanding of many agadata--especially the fantastical ones-- is the standard, traditional approach.